Richard V. Thomas v. Ashley Regional Medical Center : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2011
Richard V. Thomas v. Ashley Regional Medical
Center : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Richard V. Thomas; Plaintiff Pro Se.
Unknown.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Thomas v. Ashley Regional Medical Center, No. 20110519 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2011).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2912
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RICHARD V. THOMAS, MD 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
ASHLEY REGIONAL MEDICAL 
CENTER; . 
SI HUTT, individually; 
JOHN GRIFFITH, MD, individually; 
DAVID PERRY, MD, individually; 
DAVID RICHARDS, MD, individually; 
KIMBERLY KOBERNICK, RN, 
individually, / 
Defendants and Appellees. 
' • ' . ' ' • / 
Eighth District Court No: 110800013 
Court of Appeals Case No: 20110519-CA 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 
* A * 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Eighth District Court 
Uintah County, Utah 
HONORABLE Clark McClellan, Judge 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
MAR3UM2 
RICHARD V. THOMAS 
38 East 100 North, Suite A 
Vernal, UT 84078 
435-789-8627 Phone 
435-789-6759 Fax 
Plaintiff Pro Se 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RICHARD V. THOMAS, MD 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
ASHLEY REGIONAL MEDICAL 
CENTER; 
SI HUTT, individually; 
JOHN GRIFFITH, MD, individually; 
DAVID PERRY, MD, individually; 
DAVID RICHARDS, MD, individually; 
KIMBERLY KOBERNICK, RN, 
individually, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Eighth District Court No: 110800013 
Court of Appeals Case No: 20110519-CA 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 
& * Vc 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Eighth District Court 
Uintah County, Utah 
HONORABLE Clark McClellan, Judge 
RICHARD V. THOMAS 
38 East 100 North, Suite A 
Vernal, UT 84078 
435-789-8627 Phone 
435-789-6759 Fax 
Plaintiff Pro Se 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 4 
Cases 4 
Rules 4 
Statutes 4 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 5 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 5 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 7 
Nature of the Case 7 
Course Proceedings and Disposition of the Case 7 
Relevant Facts 8 
Summary of the Argument 11 
ARGUMENT 12 
Point 1 - The district court erred by not following the established standard of review 
under the Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 12 
4 
Point 2 - The district court erred by seeing the complaint from Thomas I and the 
amended complaint from Thomas II as being "virtually identical" 13 
Point 3 - Did the district court err as a matter of law by claiming that the doctrine of res 
judicata prevents a plaintiff from filing a subsequent complaint? 15 
Point 4 - Did the eighth District Court err as a matter of law by claiming that the 
appellant's defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims are barred 
by the one-year statute of limitation? 17 
2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Point 5 • Did the eighth District Court err as a mailer of equity when it barred the 
appellant from amending his complaint to satisfy the particularity requirement of Rule 9b 
ofthe Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? 18 
*'«INCLUSION 19 
3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Arrow Industries, Inc. v. Zions National Bank, 767P.2d 935, 936 12 
(Utah 1988) 
Avilav. Winn, 794P.2d20 (Utah 1990) 5 
Brownv. Wanlass, 2001 UTApp30, 18P.3d 1137(UtahApp., 2001) 18 
Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 402-03 15 
Gillmorev. Wright, 850P.2d431, 434-36, (Utah 1993) 5 
Henrettyv. Manti City Corp., 791 P.2d506 (Utah 1990) 5 
Macris & Associates, Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 16 P. 3d 1214 2000 UT 93 
(Utah 2000) 15 
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d245 (Utah, 1988) 16 
Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson, Inc., 815 P. 2d 1356, 1360 (Utah App. 1991) 12 
Pearson v. Lamb, 2005 UT App 383, 121 P. 3d 717 (UT, 2005) 17 
Penrodv. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1983) 
Schaer v. State, 657P.2d 1337 (Utah, 1983) 15 
Searle Bros v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1978) 16 
St. Benedict's Development Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194, 196 
(Utah 1991) 12 
Wilde v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 635 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah 1981) 16 
Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P. 2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982) 18 
Rules 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 4(c) 7 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 5,12 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 42(a) 5 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 9(b) 18 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)0) 5 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-302(4) 17, 18 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-111(1) 17 
4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Pursuant to rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this matter was 
transferred by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah to the Utah Court of Appeals. This 
was done by order dated June 16, 2011, which order was filed with the Utah Court of 
Appeals on the same date. This court's jurisdiction is conferred upon it pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78a-4-103(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The order of the District Court was made as a matter of law and therefore the 
appellate court is not required to accept the conclusions of the District Court but show 
review of the questions of law independently. Avila v. Winn, 794 P. 2d 20 (Utah 1990); 
Henretty v. Manti City Corp., 791 P.2d 506 (Utah 1990). 
An additional standard of review is whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
granting the defendants' Motion for Dismissal with Prejudice without allowing the 
Plaintiff the opportunity to argue at hearing several of this issues that are on appeal 
before this court. As such, the trial court's decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, 
capricious, and a clear abuse of its discretion. (R: 0219) Gillmore v. Wright, 850 P. 2d 
431, 434-36, (Utah 1993). 
The following issues are presented on appeal: 
5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1. Did the district court err by not following the established standard of review 
under the Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)? The court ruled against a request for hearing 
so the Plaintiff could argue this point. (R:0215-0219); also refer to Arrow Industries, Inc. 
v. Zions National Bank, 161 P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 1988) 
2. Did the district court err by claiming that cases Thomas I and Thomas II were 
".. .virtually identical... "71 The court ruled against a request for hearing so the Plaintiff 
could argue this point. (R: 0216) 
3. Did the district court err as a matter of law by claiming that the doctrine of res 
judicata prevents a plaintiff from filing a subsequent complaint? The court ruled against a 
request for hearing so the Plaintiff could argue this point. (R:0216) 
4. Did the eighth District Court err as a matter of law by claiming that the 
appellant's defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims are barred 
by the one-year statute of limitation? The court ruled against a request for hearing so the 
Plaintiff could argue this point. (R: 0217) 
5. Did the eighth District Court err as a matter of equity when it barred the 
appellant from amending his complaint to satisfy the particularity requirement of Rule 9b 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? The court ruled against a request for hearing so the 
Plaintiff could argue this point. (R: 0219) 
1
 For ease of discussion, "Thomas I" refers to the original complaint filed on December 
16, 2008. 'Thomas II" refers to the second complaint filed on January 7, 2011. 
6 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a final order of the eight judicial District Court, for Uintah 
County, the Hon. Clark McClellan presiding, wherein the court found as a matter of law, 
and, ".. .based upon the courts review of the pleadings, and for good cause shown,..." 
that Thomas 2 should be dismissed. (R: 0231-0233) 
Course Proceedings and Disposition of the Case 
On December 16, 2008, the Appellant filed a case number 080925868 in Eighth 
District Court in Uintah County. On January 6, 2010, the District Court dismissed the 
complaint for failure to prosecute. 
On January 7, 2011, the Appellant filed complaint 110800013, which, due to new 
information discovered, was based on significantly new information than the previous 
case. After filing the new case, the Appellant discovered additional information that 
required that he amend the original complaint and add an additional defendant and causes 
of action to the complaint. This amendment was done within the defendant's answer 
deadline, such that leave of court was not required. 
On May 9, 2011, the District Court granted the Appellee's Motion to Dismiss the 
Amended Complaint and Request for Hearing and refused to consider the other pending 
motions that had been subsequently filed by both sides. 
The Appellant filed an appeal with the Utah Supreme Court who transferred the 
case to the Utah Court of Appeals. Pursuant to rule 10 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
7 
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Procedure, the case was before the court on a sua sponte motion for summary disposition 
because the appeal had been filed on an order that was not appealable, the court lacked 
jurisdiction to consider the appeal. 
The Appellee's submitted and received a final order from the Eighth District 
Court. The district court entered its final, appealable order on September 8, 2011. 
On October 3, 2011, the Utah Court of Appeals entered an order pursuant to rule 
4(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure to allow the appeal to proceed to the next 
procedural stage. 
Relevant Facts 
Dr. Richard Thomas had clinical privileges and medical staff membership at 
Ashley Regional Medical Center and practiced there as an OB/GYN from November 
2004 to October 2008. During that time, Dr. John Griffith OB/GYN, also gained clinical 
privileges and medical staff membership at Ashley Regional Medical Center. While 
working together and Ashley Regional Medical Center, both Dr. Thomas and Dr. Griffith 
used the same billing and practice management contractor, Kent Mecham, the principal 
and president of Carepoint Network. (R: 0038-0039) 
Sometime early in 2008, Dr. Thomas was approached by Mr. Mecham and was 
told that the billing of Dr. Griffith far exceeded that of Dr. Thomas. After further 
analysis, it was discovered by both Dr. Thomas and Mr. Mecham that questionable 
8 
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billing techniques were being employed by Dr. Griffith. Mr. Mecham suggested that Dr. 
Thomas employ similar billing techniques as those being used by Dr. Griffith. Dr. 
Thomas stated to Mr. Mecham that he felt such billing practices constituted fraud and he 
would not go forward with such practices. Several weeks after this meeting, Mr. Mecham 
admitted to Dr. Thomas that he had disclosed the fact that Dr. Thomas was aware of the 
billing practices of Dr. Griffith to Dr. Griffith and Mr. Si Hutt, the CEO of Ashley 
Regional Medical Center. (R: 0039) 
It was known by the medical staff membership of Ashley Regional Medical Center 
that Mr. Si Hutt was not satisfied with the performance of the medical practice of Dr. 
Richard Thomas, even though Dr. Thomas was not employed directly by the hospital. In 
August of 2008, Hutt attended a medical staff meeting where he had informed those in 
attendance that Dr. Richard Thomas's practice was not going to make it and that he was 
actively recruiting another OB/GYN to replace Dr. Thomas (Dr. Thomas was not in 
attendance at this meeting). However, Hutt never discussed the financial performance of 
the practice with Dr. Richard Thomas prior to making such a bold statement to the entire 
medical staff of the hospital. (R: 0039-0040) 
Sometime during early 2008, Lifepoint Hospitals, the parent company of Ashley 
Regional Medical Center, using information received from Hutt, distributed a national 
recruiting notice stating as follows: (R: 0040) 
OB-GYN - The Hospital had 27% grown year over year from 
2006 over 2007. Many young families are moving to the area 
9 
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for work. Dr. Griffith has a full practice as does Dr. 
Breitenbach (FP/OB). Dr. Anderson (FP/OB) is on track to 
deliver about 60 babies this year. Dr. Thomas, OB/GYN -
who arrived 2 years before Dr. Thomas (sic) is struggling and 
it appears he may not stay in the community. The new 
physician would replace Dr. Thomas, as there probably is not 
room for 5 OB's on staff. 
It is essential to note that notwithstanding the comments made by CEO Hutt at the 
medical staff meeting, September of 2008 proved to be the most revenue generating 
month ever for Dr. Thomas's practice, and all indications were that his practice was only 
going to grow from there. 
During the month of October 2008, Dr. Thomas had two very complex medical 
cases that resulted in complications. The complications that had resulted from the 
surgeries of these two cases were complications that could be expected given the 
complexity of the cases. Because of these two cases, Dr. Thomas's medical privileges and 
medical staff membership at Ashley Regional Medical Center were summarily 
suspended. (R: 0040-0041) 
During the course of Thomas I, it was discovered that to protect members of 
Ashley Regional Medical Centers medical staff, the medical records of the two complex 
cases were found to have been altered, contained forged signatures, and physicians notes 
that had been inserted days after Dr. Thomas's summary suspension. (R: 0041) 
10 
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Shortly thereafter Dr. Thomas proceeded through a peer review, and it was 
determined that his privileges and medical staff membership at Ashley Regional Medical 
Center would be permanently revoked. Another important note during this peer review 
process, Dr. Griffith served as the expert witness against Dr. Thomas. At that time, Dr. 
Griffith was suspected of fraudulent billing practices and was a direct competitor of Dr. 
Thomas. (R: 0041) 
Because Dr. Thomas lost his main source of revenue, doing deliveries and 
surgeries at Ashley Regional Medical Center, his cash flow decreased immediately and 
he was unable to continue financing the cost of proceeding with Thomas I. As such, on 
January 6, 2010, the District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to prosecute. 
Summary of the Argument 
The District Court abused its discretion by claiming that Thomas II was virtually 
identical to Thomas 1. The court also abused its discretion when it claimed that Thomas 
II was based on the same allegations as Thomas I. It would appear that the court failed to 
carefully review both complaints, as Thomas II is based on a significant number of 
additional facts than Thomas I. 
Also, the court erred when it agreed with the defendant's argument that Thomas II 
is barred by the doctrine of res judicata under both claim preclusion and issue preclusion. 
Given the facts presented in Thomas II, it is impossible to bar the complaint by using the 
11 
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doctrine of res judicata under either claim preclusion or issue preclusion given the 
requirements to bar a claim based on this doctrine. 
Finally, the court erred by not granting the appellant his due process rights under 
both federal and state law by not allowing the case to proceed at the very least through 
the discovery stage of the judicial process. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1 - The district court erred by not following the established standard of 
review under the Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 
The trial court failed to follow the established standard of review in granting the 
defendants rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss with prejudice. Among other things, the court 
should not have granted the motion unless it appeared to assert that Dr. Thomas would 
not be entitled to relief under any set of facts that could be proven in support of his 
claims. Arrow Industries, Inc. v. Zions National Bank, 767 P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 1988). In 
addition, the trial court was required to "except the factual allegations of the complaint as 
true and consider them and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them in a light 
most favorable to [Dr. Thomas]." St. Benedict's Development Co. v. St. Benedict's 
Hospital, 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991); see also Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson, Inc., 815 
12 
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P.2d 1356, 1360 (Utah App. 1991). As demonstrated below, the trial court failed to 
follow these established rules, and its dismissal order should be reversed. 
The amended complaint in Thomas II included facts that moved the foundation of 
the case from simply one of trying to oust Dr. Thomas, who the administration didn't like, 
to one where Ashley Regional Medical Center was trying to oust Dr. Thomas who knew 
of fraudulent and illegal billing practices being utilized by one of its highest revenue 
generating physicians. 
The trial court was required to accept all of these factual allegations as true and to 
construe the complaint and all reasonable inferences in favor of Dr. Thomas. Instead, it 
disregarded the alleged facts and favorable inferences, concluding that in light of the 
additional factual allegations included in Thomas II, res judicata precluded Dr. Thomas 
from now asserting his rights under the law. 
Point 2 - The district court erred by seeing the complaint from Thomas I and the 
amended complaint from Thomas II as being "virtually identical". 
In the District Court's summation of its Ruling and Order filed on May 9, 2011 it 
states that, "... The plaintiff filed a new complaint in this case which is virtually identical 
to the complaint filed in case number 080925868 except that additional individual 
[Ashley Regional Medical Center] employees are named and new claims for fraud, 
negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress were alleged. The new 
13 
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complaint is based on the same allegation as the previous complaint: that the plaintiff was 
the victim of a concerted effort to fabricate criticisms of his care of patients in October 
2008 in order to improperly removed him from the medical staff at [Ashley Regional 
Medical Center]." 
As was stated previously, Thomas I and Thomas II are based on different 
allegations and facts. Yes, both complaints allege that Dr. Thomas was the victim of a 
concerted effort to fabricate criticisms of his care of patients to improperly remove him 
from the medical staff at Ashley Regional Medical Center, but the facts and allegations as 
to why he was being improperly removed are completely different in Thomas II. In 
Thomas I, it was alleged that Dr. Thomas was being improperly removed simply because 
of false accusations of the care of his patients. In Thomas II, the foundation of the 
complaint is that Dr. Thomas was being improperly removed because of his knowledge 
of the fraudulent billing practices of his direct competitor Dr. Griffith. In short, Thomas I 
had to do with differences of opinion and perhaps clashes of personality, but Thomas II 
clearly differentiates the two complaints with facts and allegations that his improper 
removal from Ashley Regional Medical Center was due to money for both Dr. Griffith 
and Ashley Regional Medical Center. 
The district court drastically erred by not allowing Thomas II to proceed to the 
next procedural stage and allow for the gathering of discovery to prove the two 
complaints rested on significantly different facts and allegations. 
14 
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Point 3 - Did the district court err as a matter of law by claiming that the doctrine of 
res judicata prevents a plaintiff from filing a subsequent complaint? 
The district court based its decision on its application of the doctrine of res 
judicata by the application of both claim preclusion and issue preclusion. However if one 
follows the requirements of the doctrine and its two branches, it is obvious that the 
District Court erred when it dismissed portions of Thomas II. 
In determining whether claims are identical for res judicata purposes, the courts 
have focused on whether, "... the two causes of action rest on a different state of facts 
and evidence of a different kind or character is necessary to sustain the two causes of 
action." Schaer v. State, 657 P.2d 1337 (Utah, 1983). One can see clearly that for res 
judicata purposes, Thomas I and Thomas II are not identical, are not, "virtually 
identical", and the rest on a different state of facts and evidence of a different kind. 
The courts have held that there are "narrow exceptions" to res judicata, arguing 
that, ".. .there are cases in which the doctrine of res judicata must give way to... 
overriding concerns of public policy and simple justice." Federated Department Stores, 
Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 402-03. Thomas II is a perfect example of a case in which 
public policy and simple justice out way the requirements of the doctrine of res judicata. 
In the medical field, forcing a physician out of business because he knew of improper 
billing practices of his competitor is of huge concern to public policy and simple justice. 
As such, the District Court grossly erred by not allowing Thomas II to go forward and the 
proper evidence gathered and presented in a formal tribunal. 
15 
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The Supreme Court of Utah has held that in order for the doctrine of res judicata, 
and more specifically claim preclusion to bar a subsequent cause of action, a plaintiff 
must satisfy three requirements: First, both cases must involve the same parties or their 
privies. Second, the claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the 
first suit or must be one that could and should have been raised in the first action. Third, 
the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. Maoris & Associates, 
Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 16 P.3d 1214, 2000 UT93 (Utah, 2000) In Thomas II, different 
defendants were named, and therefore, the parties involved in the case were different. 
Second, in Thomas II the claims that were alleged were significantly different as to form, 
facts, and allegations. Finally, Thomas I did not result in a final judgment on the merits, 
as it was simply dismissed for failure to prosecute. As such, the district court's ruling 
based on claim preclusion was not satisfied and the ruling should be reversed. 
The second major issue considered by the District Court was the issue preclusion 
branch of the doctrine of res judicata. "Under the rules of issue preclusion, the 
adjudication of an issue bars its re-litigation in another action only if four requirements 
are met. First, the issue in both cases must be identical. Second, the judgment must be 
final with respect to that issue. Third, the issue must have been fully, fairly, and 
competently litigated in the first action. Fourth, the party who is precluded from litigating 
the issue must be either a party to the first action or a privy of a party." Madsen v. 
Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah, 1988); Wilde v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 635 P.2d 417, 419 
(Utah 1981); Searle Bros v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1978). In analyzing Thomas 
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II, it is plain to see that the complaint doesn't meet these four requirements for 
preclusion. First, the issues in both cases are not identical. They're not even "virtually 
identical" as suggested by the district court. This alone bars the district court from not 
allowing the complaint to move forward based on issue preclusion. Next, the question 
comes as to whether the first action was "fully, fairly and competently litigated." It's safe 
to say that because the case hadn't even moved past the pleading stage and that no 
discovery was completed, the action wasn't fully, fairly and competently litigated. As 
such, the case should be returned to the district court for full, fair and competent 
litigation. 
Point 4 - Did the eighth District Court err as a matter of law by claiming that the 
appellant's defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims are 
barred by the one-year statute of limitation? 
The District Court concluded that Dr. Thomas's defamation and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress claims are barred by the one-year statute of limitations 
citing Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-302(4). However, the court failed to take into 
consideration Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-111(1) which states, "If any action is timely filed 
and the judgment for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in the action or upon 
a cause of action otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited either by law or 
contract for commencing the action has expired, the plaintiff... May commence a new 
action within one year after the reversal or failure." Pearson v. Lamb, 2005 UTApp 383, 
121 P. 3d 717 (UT, 2005) 
17 
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Thomas I was a failed action which failure was not upon the merits of the case, but 
due to a dismissal for failure to prosecute. As such Utah code clearly allows the 
commencement of a new action so long as it is commenced within one year after the 
reversal or failure of the first action. Thomas II was commenced within one year after the 
dismissal for failure to prosecute of Thomas I. This portion of the case should be 
remanded back to the District Court for further proceedings. 
Point 5 - Did the eighth District Court err as a matter of equity when it barred the 
appellant from amending his complaint to satisfy the particularity requirement of 
Rule 9b of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? 
To plead fraud was particularity, a plaintiff must allege that there was a fault 
representation of an existing material fact made knowingly or recklessly for the purpose 
of them do seem reliance there on, and reasonable reliance resulting in the plaintiffs 
injury. Brown v. Wanlass, 2001 UTApp 30, 18 P.3d 1137 (Utah App., 2001). The courts 
have gone on to say that, ".. .rule 9(b) requires a complaint to recite "[t]he relevant 
surrounding facts"... With sufficient articulation to show what facts are claimed to 
constitute [the fraud] charges. (Quoting Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966, 
971 (Utah 1982) 
18 
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CONCLUSION 
First, the trial court erred when it ordered a Dismissal with Prejudice the claims of 
breach of contract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, defamation and 
restraint of trade, based on the doctrine of Res Judicata. 
Second, the trial court erred when it ordered a Dismissal with Prejudice the claims 
of defamation and intentional infliction of emotion distress based on Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-2-302(4), stating that those claims are barred by the one year statute of limitations. 
Finally, the trial court erred when it ordered a Dismissal with Prejudice the claim 
of fraud due to 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Judgment at the trial court should be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 30th day of March, 2012. 
Dr. Richard V. Thomas, MD 
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